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CHRISTIAN V. GRAY: THE OKLAHOMA SUPREME
COURT ACCEPTS THE DAUBERT STANDARD
DEBRA W. MCCORMICK* & RANDON J. GRAu**

I. Introduction
Over a decade has passed since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.' regarding the standard for
admitting expert testimony. Although Daubert changed the everyday
practices of attorneys in federal courts across the nation, Daubert may not
seem like a "recent development" deserving attention as one of the latest legal
trends.2 In Christian v. Gray,3 however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
recently adopted the standard set forth in Daubert and Kumho Tire Co. v.
4 thus reviving the
Carmichael,
interest in examining Daubert,its progeny, and
its unique application regarding the standard of review within the context of
the Oklahoma civil court system.
This Article discusses the Oklahoma Supreme Court's adoption of the
Daubertstandard in Oklahoma. Part ]J introduces the Daubert standard and
explores the U.S. Supreme Court cases following and applying Daubert.Part
Il traces the history and development of the Daubertstandard in Oklahoma.
Next, Part IV examines Christianv. Gray, in which the Oklahoma Supreme
Court adopted Daubertfor civil cases in Oklahoma. Finally, Part V illustrates
how Oklahoma courts may apply Daubertin future civil cases.
II. The DaubertStandard
In Daubert,the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the "generally accepted" rule
for admissibility of scientific evidence established in Frye v. United States,5
and instead held that the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), adopted some fifty

1. Founding partner, Mitzner, Rubenstein, Bryan, McCormick & Pitts, P.L.L.C.,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. B.S., William Woods College (Missouri), 1977; J.D., Oklahoma
City University, 1989. Managing Editor, Oklahoma City University Law Review, 1988-1989.
2. Attorney, McKinney & Stringer, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. B.A., Pepperdine
University, 1998; J.D., University of Oklahoma, 2001.
The authors thank OU law student Rick Warren for his assistance with this article.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Robert J. Shaughnessy, DaubertAfter a Decade, 30 LrTIG. 19, 19 (2003).
3. 2003 OK 10, 65 P.3d 591.
4. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
5. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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years after Frye, controlled admissibility of expert testimony.6 In doing so,
the Court held that FRE 702 did not incorporate the Frye standard, which
required a court to determine the general acceptance of the proposed expert's
method in the relevant scientific community.7 Instead, the Court found that
the rigid Frye test was at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules. 8
In rejecting the Frye standard, the Court noted that the role of the trial
judge is to screen all expert evidence, thus acting as a "gatekeeper"
responsible for determining whether such evidence is admissible. 9 The Court
found that the trial judge, as gatekeeper, is responsible for determining both
the relevance and reliability of expert testimony.10
In examining the relevance of proffered expert testimony, the trial judge
must conclude whether the proposed testimony will "assist the trier of fact,"
as stated by FRE 702, meaning that the evidence must "fit" the issues in the
case." If the evidence is relevant, then the trial court must determine whether
the expert testimony is reliable. The Daubert Court held that a judge may
consider the following factors when determining whether expert testimony is
reliable: (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested;
(2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error and
whether there are standards controlling the technique's operation; and
(4) whether the relevant scientific community generally accepts the technique
or theory.' 2
The U.S. Supreme Court further defined and expanded the Daubert
standard in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. Although Daubert limited the
reliability analysis to "scientific knowledge," the Kumho Tire Court extended
the Daubertanalysis and held that the underlying reliability requirement in
including those who rely on technical
Daubertapplied to all expert witnesses,
13
or other specialized knowledge.
In both Daubert and Kumho Tire, the Court emphasized the flexibility of
the factors a court should consider in determining whether expert testimony

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Daubert,509 U.S. at 588-89.
Id.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.
Id.
Id. at591.
Id. at 593-94.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
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is reliable.' 4 Moreover, the Court reiterated in Kumho Tire that such factors
are intended to be helpful but nonexhaustive. The Kumho Tire Court stated:
[A] trial court may consider one or more of the more specific
factors that Daubertmentioned when doing so will help determine
that testimony's reliability. But, as the Court stated in Daubert,the
test ofreliability is "flexible," and Daubert's list of specific factors
neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every
case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad latitude
when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect
to its ultimate reliability determination. 5
A few years after establishing the Daubert standard, the Supreme Court
revisited the flexibility of Daubert in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.6 In
Joiner,the Court considered an Eleventh Circuit decision in which the circuit
court held that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of the
respondent's expert witness. 7 The Eleventh Circuit applied the abuse of
discretion standard of review, but found that "because the Federal Rules of
Evidence governing expert testimony display a preference for admissibility,
we apply a particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge's
exclusion of expert testimony."'"
Further emphasizing the flexibility of Daubert,the Supreme Court found
that the appellate court had erred in applying an overly "stringent" review to
the district court's ruling. 9 First, the Court held that an appellate court cannot
categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony and those
excluding it when applying the abuse of discretion standard.20 Second, the
Court held that, in applying a stringent standard, the appellate court failed to
give the trial court "the deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion
review."'" Noting that the Daubert decision did not address the standard of
appellate review for evidentiary rulings, the Court established that abuse of
discretion is the appropriate standard in reviewing a trial court's decision to
2
either exclude or admit expert testimony under Daubert."

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See id. at 141-42; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 141-42.
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
Id. at 140.
Id. (quoting Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 14243.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004

790

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:787

Ill. The History and Development of the DaubertStandard in Oklahoma
Although the Daubertstandard is relatively new to Oklahoma civil cases,
it is not new to Oklahoma state courts. In 1995, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals23 adopted the Daubert standard in Taylor v. State.24 The
court of criminal appeals decided that the Daubert standard would provide a
more uniform way for courts to address the admissibility of scientific expert
testimony and evidence.25 The court also determined that trial judges must
continue to act as gatekeepers, ensuring that novel scientific evidence is both
reliable and relevant.26 The court further found that a pretrial hearing was
necessary to determine whether the testimony or evidence met the
two-pronged test of reliability and relevance. 7
The attractiveness of the Daubertstandard to the court of criminal appeals
was its structured, yet flexible approach.28 In Taylor, the court addressed the
complex scientific issue of DNA match evidence analysis. In doing so, the
court found that the particular evidence was novel, and because the court had
not previously considered the reliability of such evidence, it required a pretrial
hearing.2 9
Notably, the court did not require such a hearing for the testimony of every
expert witness to be deemed admissible. Rather, the court required a pretrial
hearing only for novel scientific evidence. 0 Therefore, if the court had

23. In Oklahoma, the court of criminal appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
regarding all criminal matters, and thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court does not typically hear
criminal cases. See OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4.
24. 1995 OKCR 10, 889 P.2d 319.
25. Id. 16, 889 P.2d at 329.
26. Id. 17, 889 P.2d at 329.
27. Id. 44, 889 P.2d at 339.
28. Id. 15, 889 P.2d at 328.
29. Id. 1 44, 889 P.2d at 339. The court explained the reason for such a hearing when it
considered novel scientific evidence:
The purpose of this hearing will be to determine whether such evidence is
sufficiently "reliable" and "relevant" to warrant admission. This evidence may be
considered "reliable" if it is grounded in the methods and procedures of science.
The "relevancy" component simply requires that scientific or technical evidence
bear a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry and thereby assist the
trier of fact in assessing the issues. Finally, the trial court should consider whether
the probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. This Court will independently review a trial judge's decision
admitting or excluding novel scientific or technical evidence to determine whether
it passes muster under Daubert.
Id.
30. Id.
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previously determined that the scientific or technical evidence or method met
the requisite reliability standard for admission, then such a hearing would be
unnecessary.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals further incorporated Daubertand
its progeny in the case of Gilson v. State.3 ' In Gilson, the court determined
that, based on Kumho Tire, the Daubertstandard extended to testimony based
on "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge.32 Notably, the court in
Gilson reviewed the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion,3 contrary
to the de novo standard of review used by the court in Taylor.34 The court
provided no explanation for its change in standard of review, but only stated
that it applied the abuse of discretion standard as set forth by Kumho Tire.35
IV. Adoption of Daubertin the Oklahoma Civil Courts - Christian v. Gray
The early adoption and application of the Daubertstandard in Oklahoma,
as used in the state criminal court system, essentially followed the
development of the standard as it progressed through the federal courts. In
adopting the Daubert standard in the Oklahoma civil court system, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court indicated in Christianv. Gray that it will similarly
follow the gatekeeping standards established by the federal courts and applied
by the Oklahoma criminal courts.36
In Christian,the plaintiffs alleged that they suffered injury by inhaling
airborne chemicals while attending the circus at the state fair arena.37 The
plaintiffs' expert witness was a medical doctor who claimed that the plaintiffs'
permanent restrictive lung impairment was typical after exposure to certain
inhalants, and that lime in the air at the state fair arena could have been one
of those materials.3" The defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude the
testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witness on the basis that the defendants did
not cause the plaintiffs' injuries. 9 The trial court granted the defendants'
motion and stated that the expert was incompetent to provide a medical
opinion on the cause of the plaintiffs' lung injuries.' The plaintiffs appealed

31. 2000 OK CR 14, 8 P.3d 883.
32. Id. 64-68, 8 P.3d at 907-08.
33. Id. 68, 8 P.3d at 908.

34. Id. n.5, 8 P.3d at 908 n.5.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Christian v. Gray, 2003 OK 10,
See id. 1, 65 P.3d at 594.
Id. 116,65 P.3dat601.
Id. 2, 65 P.3d at 594.
Id.

11, 65 P.3d 591, 599-600.
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the trial court's decision, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted
certiorari.4' In granting certiorari, the supreme court warned that it was not
assuming the role of a "pre-trial reviewing court" for motions in limine, but
instead assumed jurisdiction because of the importance of the first impression
issue "for a procedure to be used by courts statewide ....
The supreme court first had to determine whether Daubert was the proper
standard by which to judge the admissibility of the proffered expert
testimony.4 3 The court noted the similarities between the Oklahoma Evidence
Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence." In justifying the application of
Daubert in state civil cases, the court explained that federal court decisions
construing federal evidence rules, which are substantially similar to Oklahoma
rules, can be examined for persuasive value.45 The court also stated that the
"[Oklahoma] Evidence Code currently recognizes the gatekeeping capacity of
46
a trial judge, and Daubert is but a refinement of this role."
In accepting the Daubertstandard, the court made several references to the
court of criminal appeals' previous adoption and its finding that the standard
should be applied to all novel expert testimony.47 The court ultimately agreed
with the court of criminal appeals that the Oklahoma Evidence Code did not
distinguish between "scientific," "technical," or "other specialized"
knowledge, and therefore, a Daubert inquiry applied to all novel expert
testimony.48
The court found that the Oklahoma Evidence Code contains the same
requirement as Daubert, which requires the trial court to determine the
preliminary questions regarding the proposed expert's qualifications and
admissibility of evidence, relating to both relevance and reliability.49 In sum,
the court stated, "Nothing in Daubertor Kumho conflicts with our Evidence
Code. Our Court of Criminal Appeals has already adopted Daubert for
criminal proceedings in Oklahoma Courts. Today we likewise adopt Daubert

41. Id. 1 0, 65 P.3d at 594.
42. Id. 3, 65 P.3d at 596.
43. Id. 4, 65 P.3d at 597.
44. Id. 6, 65 P.3d at 597 (noting that rules 2703 and 2704 in the Oklahoma Evidence
Code are identical to FRE 703 and 704; that rule 2702 is "identical in substance" to FRE 702;
and that rule 2705 has slightly different language than FRE 705, but the same substantive
meaning).
45. Id.
46. Id. 1 9, 65 P.3d at 599.
47. Id. 1 11, 65 P.3d at 599.
48. Id. 1 10, 65 P.3d at 599.
49. Id. [9, 65 P.3d at 598.
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and Kumho as appropriate standards for Oklahoma trial courts in deciding the
admissibility of expert testimony in civil matters."" °
A. Application and Satisfaction of the Daubert Standard
After determining that Daubert was the proper standard, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court defined what must be shown to satisfy the Daubertstandard."s
The factors the court found the trial court should consider in satisfying
Daubert include: (1) determining the relevancy of the expert testimony; (2)
determining the reliability of the expert testimony; and (3) applying the factors
that the trial court has identified to the evidence or expert at issue.
First, the trial court must determine whether the expert testimony is
relevant. Relying on Daubert, the Christiancourt found that the evidence
must assist the trier of fact and that this requirement "goes primarily to
relevance." 2 Further, the court held that, like Daubert, the determination of
the expert's qualifications is also a preliminary question the trial court must
address.5 3 Under Rule 2105 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code, which the court
found to be similar to FRE 104, both relevance of the expert's testimony and
expert qualifications are preliminary questions.5 4
Once a trial court has determined that the evidence is relevant, the court
must then address its reliability. The Christian court held that a Daubert
inquiry is only required for novel expert testimony, stating that "a Daubert
challenge includes an initial determination of whether the expert's method is
one where reliability may be taken for granted."" Simply stated, courts need
not engage in a judicial reinvention of the wheel for every proffered expert.
If the testimony, methodology, or technique is not novel, then there is no need
for a Daubertinquiry concerning reliability.
If it is novel, however, courts must identify the appropriate factors to apply
to the expert's methodology or technique to determine whether the evidence

50. Id. 14, 65 P.3d at 600.
51. Id. 40,65 P.3d at 608. The court did not outline adefinite procedure or chronological
order that a trial court must follow in applying the Daubert standard. It is important that a
Daubert inquiry proceed in a logical manner, however, so that the parties and courts do not
waste time and effort on evidentiary issues that do not clear the most basic preliminary hurdles.
Certainly, a successful challenge to the admission of expert testimony may depend on the
challenger skillfully leading a court through the maze of Daubert considerations.
52. Id. 9,65 P.3d at 598. Daubert held that expert testimony must "fit" the issues in the
case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
53. Christian 9, 65 P.3d at 598.
54. Id.

55. Id. 11, 65 P.3d at 600 (emphasis added).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
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is reliable.56 The Christiancourt held that "the Daubertfactors are not a rigid
standard applicable in every case"; 7 instead "[t]he Daubert factors "may"
bear on ajudge's gatekeeping determinations" but that will "all depend 'on the
nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his
testimony."58
Thus, a court must tailor the factors based on the nature of the controversy,
including any or all Daubert factors, to determine the reliability of the
evidence. In determining such factors, the court must ensure that the expert
did not create his methodology or technique simply for the sake of trial.
Instead, the expert's testimony must meet the same "intellectual rigor" the
expert would use in the "real world" within the relevant discipline. In
answering the self-posed question, "[Hiow can the courts effectively police
the system?," one commentator notes that "[t]hey can separate reliable expert
testimony from the unreliable by employing the objective rules and standards
that exist outside the courtroom."59
Finally, the trial court must apply the factors it has identified to the
evidence or expert at issue. In doing so, the trial court must specifically state
the facts found and used to support its order. The Christiancourt found it
difficult to determine the facts that supported the trial court's decision because
the trial court did not clearly state those facts. The court stated that "[w]hen
a trial court applies Daubert and determines that a particular method is
required for the admissibility of a particular expert's conclusions the order
should state those facts that the trial court relied upon in making that
determination."'
B. Analysis of the Standardof Review
In addressing the proper standard of review, the Christiancourt held that
the abuse of discretion standard applies in reviewing a trial court's ruling to
either admit or exclude expert testimony. 61 The court explained that the abuse
of discretion standard requires the appellate court to further examine whether
the trial court determined an issue of law or fact.6 2 Then, after determining

56. Id. 13, 65 P.3d at 600.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting FED. JUDICIALCTR., REFERENCE MANUALON SCIENTIFICEVIDENCE 19 (2d
ed. 2000)).
59. Michael E. Gebauer, The "What" andthe "How" of Challenges to Expert Testimony
Under Rule 702, 43 FOR THE DEF., July 2001, at 13, 15.
60. Christian 47, 65 P.3d at 610.
61. Id. 142, 65 P.3d at 608.
62. Id. $ 51, 65 P.3d at 611.
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whether the trial court determined an issue of fact or law, the court found that
the appeals court "must determine if a deferential or a non-deferential de novo
review applies to the particular adjudication of fact, and to an issue of law [the
court will] apply a non-deferential de novo standard." '3
In applying Daubert,a trial court is called upon to determine issues of
fact . ' The court in Christian found that each of the articulated Daubert
factors involves determining issues of fact.6 Depending on the type of factual
determination, however, the court will use a deferential or nondeferential de
novo review standard." The Christiancourt noted that the trial court did not
clearly state why the conclusions of the expert were not appropriate for the
method or why the method itself was unreliable.67 However, it was clear that
the trial court rejected the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witness because,
among other reasons, the expert had no baseline pulmonary data or study to
show what the plaintiffs' pulmonary functions were before the lime
exposure.68 The trial court found that such a study was necessary to show that
airborne lime at the circus had in fact caused the plaintiffs' pulmonary
injury.69 The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, found that no facts were
before the trial court demonstrating that such a test was considered necessary
"by the relevant community of experts, or by satisfaction of any of the other
Daubertfactors."7 Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that the trial
court determined this issue based upon a fact not of record, and as such,
abused its discretion.7'
The trial court determined, to the extent it found the baseline data necessary
to support the expert's conclusion, that a reasonable person could not find a
causal link without such a study.72 In other words, the trial court's
determination that there was a lack of causation went directly to the plaintiffs'
inability to show cause in fact of the claimed injury, and thus was a legal
issue.73
Based on its prior discussion regarding the appropriate standard of review,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court found the lower court to be in error based on a

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. 1 46, 65 P.3d at 609.
Id.
Id. 41-47, 65 P.3d at 608-10.
Id. 47, 65 P.3d at 610.
Id. 49, 65 P.3d at 610.
Id. 52, 65 P.3d at 611-12.
Id. 52, 65 P.3d at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nondeferential de novo standard.74 In so concluding, the court provided the
plaintiffs with an opportunity to show either general causation or that such a
showing was not necessary for the admissibility of the particular expert's
testimony." The court further charged the parties with the responsibility of
"framing the issues for the trial court and identifying controverted issues as
either fact or law."' 6
C. The Majority'sAnalysis of Causation
After determining that Daubertwas the appropriate standard to adopt, the
supreme court did not spend time engaging in a theoretical or abstract
discussion of the standard's application. Instead, the court clearly framed the
opinion, especially the part regarding the appropriate standard of review, as
it related to the causation issues in dispute. Therefore, it is important to
understand the court's analysis of the causation issue in the context of its
decision.
The court divided allegations involving injuries from a person's exposure
to harmful substances into general and specific causation.77 General causation
is whether a substance can cause a particular injury to the general public,
whereas specific causation is whether a substance caused an injury to a
particular person. 7 ' The court held that general causation should be shown
unless it is found to be inappropriate. 79 The court did not, however, offer
specific examples of controversies where general causation would be
inappropriate. 0
The plaintiffs' expert provided evidence of lime at the arena eighteen days
after the alleged inhalation, discounted a viral infection as the cause of the
injury because no evidence of bacteria was found in the plaintiffs, and
examined plaintiffs' past medical history.8 The defendants specifically
challenged the plaintiffs' expert based on general causation, and thus, the
burden rested with the plaintiffs to show either general causation or that
general causation was not necessary for the admission of the expert's
testimony.82 The trial court found that the plaintiffs' expert failed to establish

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. 1 54, 65 P.3d at 612 (issuing a writ of prohibition).
Id. 1 55, 65 P.3d at 612.
Id. 21, 65 P.3d at 602.
Id.
Id. 26, 65 P.3d at 604.
Id. 123, 65 P.3d at 603.
Id. 1 16, 65 P.3d at 601.
Id. 1 23, 65 P.3d at 603.
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either general or specific causation for two reasons: (1)the expert failed to
explain a method for determining the amount of lime that could result in an
injury, and (2) he failed to explain a method for his conclusion that sufficient
amounts of lime were present to cause the plaintiffs' injuries."
The Christiancourt found the trial court's ruling unclear on whether (1) the
facts the expert did not know were necessary as part of a proper method, (2)
the conclusion of the expert was analytically inappropriate based on what he
did know, or (3) both." Thus, the court assumed the trial court found flaws
in both methodology and conclusions. Assuming reliability could not be taken
for granted and the expert's method for his conclusions was novel, the court
held that expert testimony was necessary." Expert testimony was necessary
to show the injury was caused from exposure to a toxin and that there was a
reliable method for determining the amount of toxin necessary to cause such
an injury, unless the plaintiffs could demonstrate that this showing of general
causation was inappropriate."6 Additionally, the court agreed that the expert's
testimony must "be analytically appropriate for the expert's method."8' 7
The court found that whether a party has satisfied Daubertdepends upon
two determinations by the trial court.88 First, the court must determine what
method is required by Daubertfor the type of controversy, and then, whether
the expert's method supports the expert's conclusion about causation.89 The
court stated that "[a]pplication of a standard of review to these determinations
requires us to distinguish fact from law and whether cause in fact is
determined as an issue of fact or as an issue of law." The court further
explained that an expert's opinion may lack sufficient facts for legal validation
"because of at least one of two reasons, (1)[i]t is without, or not based upon,
facts necessary for the method or technique used by the expert, or (2) [t]he
facts do not support the conclusion of the expert."9

83. Id. 35, 65 P.3d at 606.
84. Id. 1 37, 65 P.3d at 607.
85. Id. 38, 65 P.3d at 607.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. 40, 65 P.3d at 608.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.

51,65 P.3d at 611.
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V. Application of Daubertin the Oklahoma Civil Courts
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not yet extended, interpreted, or further
explained the Christianopinion regarding expert testimony.92 Similarly, the
appellate courts have not had the opportunity to publish opinions regarding the
resolution of evidentiary disputes after Christian.
Nevertheless, the recent decision of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
in Twyman v. GHK Corp.93 is of interest in examining how Oklahoma courts
may apply the Christiandecision. In Twyman, the appellate court found that
a trial court should apply the Daubertstandard retrospectively. 94 Although the
trial concluded before the adoption of Daubert by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Christian, the appellate court determined that the need for
scientifically reliable expert evidence warranted the retroactive application of
Christian and the Daubert standard. 95 As support for its retroactive
application, the court noted that "Daubertwas decided almost ten years before
trial here and its possible adoption in various states has been discussed widely
during that period"; thus, the adoption of Daubertstandards in Christianwas
not a "bolt out of the blue." 96 However, in seeking direction from the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the court noted that the court of
criminal appeals never determined whether it would apply Daubert
97
retrospectively to novel scientific evidence.
In Twyman, the plaintiffs were dairy farmers who claimed that pollutants
from the defendants' oilfield contaminated their farm's well and resulted in
the death of a significant portion of their dairy cows. 98 The jury found in

92. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, did rely on the Christiancase for its opinion
in Tibbetts v. Sight 'n Sound Appliance Centers,Inc., 2003 OK 72, 77 P.3d 1042, although the
case had nothing to do with the admissibility of expert testimony. Instead, the court used the
Christian case as its authority for the application of the nondeferential de novo standard of
review to a question of law. Id. 4, 77 P.3d at 1046. In citing Christian, the court noted that
"an abuse of discretion review standard includes appellate examination of both fact and law
issues" and that a de novo review standard applies when an assigned error is one of law. Id. U
3-4, 77 P.3d at 1046. The court explained that a de novo review standard was applicable
because the "overriding and critical factor of the results obtained is undisputed and leads to only
one rational conclusion as to what a reasonable fee should be .....Id.
93. 2004 OK CIV APP 53, 93 P.3d 51.
94. Id. 8, 93 P.3d at 54.
95. Id. 9117, 93 P.3d at 56.
96. Id. 1 14, 93 P.3d at 55.
97. Id. 20, 93 P.3d at 56.
98. Id. 911-3, 93 P.3d at 53.
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favor of the plaintiffs.99 The defendants appealed, claiming that the trial court
erred in admitting expert scientific testimony on causation that failed to meet
the reliability standards set forth in Daubert."°
After finding that Daubertstandards were applicable, the court considered
whether the expert testimony in controversy satisfied these standards. The
expert testimony in question related to two experts, both of whom were
veterinary doctors."' The court noted that one of the experts admitted he
developed his scientific theory of "synergistic effect," relating to why the
cows were sick, while working on this investigation and that he could not
attribute his theory to any particular individual. 2 In applying the scientific
reliability factors set forth in Daubert to this expert's testimony, the court
found:
[The expert] was not aware of any scientific literature that
supported the synergism theory with respect to the components
involved and the effect on animals, and was also not aware of
anyone else advancing such a theory. There is no evidence this
theory has been tested in any manner, nor does there appear to be
any reason why it could not have been tested. There has been no
peer review outside the body of [the plaintiffs'] own experts. In
that it is an entirely new theory, it obviously does not have general
or widespread acceptance in the relevant scientific community." 3
The court explained that the expert's diagnostic methodology was at best
suspect because he failed to consider other possible causes for the cows'
health problems during the differential diagnosis."
The court also stated that the other expert's testimony was equally
unsupportive of scientific reliability.'
During his testimony regarding his
theory about the cows' sicknesses, the expert indicated that radiation might be
one possible cause but that he could not say how much radiation was in the
water the cows actually consumed.l" He also stated that no analysis had been
performed on the well water at the time of the alleged injury and, therefore,
one could only speculate about the amounts of radiation in the water.' °7 The
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court found this expert's theory had the "uncertainty of possible causation
based on the uncertainty of an unproven assumption" and, therefore, did not
meet the standards set forth in Daubert."' Additionally, the court found this
expert, like the other expert, failed to consider the alternative explanation set
forth in the expert report provided by the defendants.' °9
Because the court held that evidence provided by both of the plaintiffs'
experts did not meet the admissibility standards of Daubert, the plaintiffs
lacked evidence sufficient to establish the requisite causation between the
defendants' actions and the plaintiffs' losses." The court reversed the trial
court's ruling and directed the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the
defendants."'
VI. Conclusion
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has unequivocally determined the standard
for the admission of expert testimony in Oklahoma. In adopting Daubert, the
Christian court explained that Oklahoma trial courts, like their federal
counterparts, must ensure that expert evidence is both relevant and reliable.
In doing so, courts must stray from the rigid Frye standard, and instead, apply
the flexible Daubert approach.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also held that it intends to follow all aspects
of the federal application of the Daubertstandard. Most notable is the court's
multitiered approach to the standard of review. In applying the abuse of
discretion standard, the appellate courts must determine the issues decided and
facts used in support of the trial court's decision. Then, depending upon
whether there has been a determination as to a matter of fact or law, the courts
must apply a clear abuse of discretion, deferential de novo, or nondeferential
de novo standard. All of these standards, however, fall within an abuse of
discretion analysis, although it is clear that some are more stringent than
others. The shifting between the more-stringent to less-stringent standard
appears to be at odds with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner. Further, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has left
unanswered the question of how an appellate court should approach the
resolution of a mixed question of law and fact.
Nevertheless, in applying Daubert in Oklahoma civil courts, practitioners
and trial courts have the benefit of over ten years of case law interpreting the
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Daubert standard. According to Christian,the court finds persuasive value
in federal court decisions applying federal rules similar to those of Oklahoma.
As such, the court will likely find some persuasiveness in the prior decisions
of the Oklahoma federal district courts and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which have both been applying Daubertsince its inception. Further,
although not bound by any decision of the court of criminal appeals, the
Christiancourt agreed with several decisions and the overall application of
Daubert by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Therefore, when
confronted with undecided issues regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony, persuasive guidance from the application of Daubertin Oklahoma
within the criminal context may assist Oklahoma practitioners and trial courts.
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